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Strength in Numbers?
The Advantages of Multiple Rankings
MICHAEL SAUDER* AND WENDY NELSON ESPELAND**
Over the last fifteen years, the U.S. News & World Report ("U.S. News") rankings
have become increasingly influential in the world of legal education. These widely
disseminated public measures of law school quality are a popular topic among
academics as well as in the media, and they have prompted critical responses from
virtually every major law school organization-including the Law School Admissions
Council (LSAC), the American Association of Legal Scholars (AALS), the National
Association of Law Placement (NALP), and the Society of American Law Teachers
(SALT). Many legal educators have also criticized the rankings and attempted to
temper their influence. Most notably, since 1997 a letter detailing the deficiencies of
the rankings and signed by a vast majority of law school deans has been sent to all
students who register to take the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and is posted on
the LSAC web site.' The letter questions the quality of information provided by U.S.
News, alleging that the rankings cannot take each student's "special needs and
circumstances into account," and that they fail to measure many factors that students
claim are most important in their choice of law school, such as the quality and
accessibility of teachers; faculty scholarship; racial, gender, and economic diversity
within the faculty and student body; the size of first-year classes; the strength of alumni
networks; student satisfaction with their education; and cost.
2
Despite this and many less-public attempts to challenge the validity, narrow the
scope, or curb the influence of the U.S. News rankings, the significance of rankings has
only grown, and many within the legal community now regard them as inevitable. In
the words of one administrator, "We can't make them go away. We don't control them.
I would say that the bottom line on rankings is that they are here and you've got to deal
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with them."3 This sense of inevitability is buttressed by the growth of the ranking
industry and broader trends toward quantification and accountability. The production
of rankings has been an extremely profitable enterprise for US. News and other rankers
of educational institutions, and the influence of these types of media rankings is
spreading.4 Magazines and newspapers in Asia, Canada, Finland, Germany, and Great
Britain-just to name a few-have issued their own rankings of local institutions.
Moreover, as prominent programs like No Child Left Behind demonstrate, pressure for
quantitative evaluation has increased enormously, creating what scholars describe as an
"audit society"sand a global "audit culture."6 These trends all indicate that rankings are
here to stay.
If rankings have become a permanent element of legal education, it is important to
carefully evaluate their consequences and devise strategies for mitigating their most
damaging effects. As prominent, widely disseminated measures, there are strong
incentives for manipulating ranking factors, manipulations that do not always enhance
legal education.7 Administrators consistently report feeling pressured to choose
between doing "what is good for the law school and what is good for rankings."
8
In light of these effects, this article considers to what extent some of the harmful
consequences of rankings are a result of US. News holding a virtual monopoly over the
ranking of law schools. By comparing the effects of law school rankings (a field where
one ranker dominates) to those of business schools (a field where multiple influential
rankers evaluate schools), we are able to suggest how the effects of law school
rankings might be mitigated if more than one credible ranking system existed for legal
education. We argue that multiple rankers create a degree of ambiguity about the
relative standing of schools and that this ambiguity allows schools to regain
3. Authors' in-depth interview with a law school administrator. The authors conducted
134 in-depth interviews with law school administrators, faculty, or administrators of national
legal education associations. The authors also conducted 30 in-depth interviews with business
school administrators, seventeen interviews with law school admissions personnel, and 93 short
interviews with prospective law students. Because these interviews were conducted with an
express understanding of confidentiality between the authors and the interviewees, none of the
interviewees are identified in this Article; citations to "Authors' interview" refer to one of the
in-depth interviews. For more details on this data, see infra Part I.
4. Law school rankings are reported in an issue that ranks other professional schools and
graduate programs. US. News also publishes annual rankings of undergraduate institutions.
These two ranking issues are best sellers. As Mel Elfin, the US. News editor who helped launch
the rankings, put it, "It became, essentially, our franchise." Roger Parloff, Who's Number One?
And Who's Number 52, 91, and 137?, AM. LAW., Apr. 5, 1998, at 7. US. News also publishes
rankings online, and began charging for access to its web site in 2003. While we do not know
current usage rates on the day rankings were posted in 1998, the US. News site received 3.3
million hits. At peak times, the site was accessed 160 times per second. College Rankings Spike
Web Traffic for U.S. News & World Report; Wordweb Servers Withstand Peak Loads of 160
Requests Per Second, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 27, 1998, available at LEXIS PR Newswire.
5. See MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RiTuALs OF VERIFICATION (1997).
6. See AUDIT CuLTUREs: ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES IN ACCOUNTABILITY, ETHICs AND
THE ACADEMY (Marilyn Strathem ed., 2000).
7. Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and
Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229 (2006).
8. Authors' interview with school administrator; see also supra note 3.
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reputational control, decreases the significance of small differences and small changes,
and, most importantly, undermines the validity of the rankings in some measure.
We conclude by suggesting that the development of rankings to compete with US.
News would be an effective tactic for combating the most pernicious effects of law
school rankings. We also provide a warning that this strategy is not without risk:
although multiple rankings might limit the influence of the US. News rankings and
enhance the discretion and autonomy of legal educators, the proliferation of rankings
would also tend to reinforce rankings as the legitimate mode of accountability in higher
education. Such a change, we caution, has the potential to exacerbate the short-term
orientation that rankings foster while marginalizing more deliberative, nonquantitative
methods of evaluation.
I. DATA
Our data were collected as part of a larger project investigating the effects of
rankings on legal education. This study draws primarily on interviews with law and
business school administrators, faculty, and staff. We conducted 134 open-ended
interviews (averaging about forty-five minutes) with law school personnel, focusing on
the positions within the law schools most affected by the rankings: the dean, and the
deans or directors of admissions and career services.9 Our sample includes interviews
from people in fifty-two of the roughly 185 ABA-accredited U.S. law schools. We also
visited seven focus schools where we interviewed key personnel in different positions
to understand better how rankings penetrate organizations. Our interviews addressed
whether and how rankings have affected legal education, and if these effects varied
across school types, focusing on variations by rank, ranking trajectory, mission,
location, and size.10 Approximately half of our interviews were conducted in person
and half by telephone. Except in a few cases where permission was denied, all
interviews were tape recorded and transcribed.
We also conducted thirty in-depth interviews with business school administrators to
determine how the effects of rankings vary across educational fields. Because,
depending on the ranking consulted, only the top 25 or 50 business schools are ranked,
this sample was concentrated on these elite schools. Twenty-five schools were
represented in these thirty interviews. As in the case of law schools, variations in rank,
trajectory, and size oriented the sample; in addition, and unlike the case of law schools,
administrators from schools that ranked considerably differently across different
rankings were also sought out to be interviewed. These interviews averaged
9. Of the 134 in-depth law interviews, thirty-seven interviewees were deans or ex-deans,
forty-five were other members of a school's administration-primarily deans or directors of
admissions and career services, and also deans of academic affairs, external relations, etc.-
thirty were faculty members, six were administrators of national legal education associations,
and nine were with people in other administrative or staff positions (e.g., directors of external
affairs, student affairs, librarians, and staff).
10. In terms of variation by rank, for example, we interviewed people from twenty-one
different schools that have been ranked in the fourth tier, twenty-six schools in the third tier,
twenty-two schools in the second tier, and eighteen schools in the first tier. Of the first tier
schools, we interviewed twelve people from schools that had been ranked in the top 25,
including five schools in the top 10.
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approximately thirty minutes in length and were conducted over the telephone, tape
recorded, and transcribed.
In addition to these interviews, we draw on several other sources of data. We
conducted an additional seventeen short interviews (averaging about ten minutes) with
law school admissions personnel as well as ninety-three short interviews (averaging
five minutes) with prospective law students at an admissions fair organized by the
LSAC. Finally, for this study we also analyzed a wide variety of organizational
material produced by and public information concerning law schools. These sources
include a content analysis of promotional material and internet information published
by law schools, a quantitative analysis of organizational statistics focusing on the
effects of rankings on admissions practices, and analyses ofboth chat room activity and
news stories that pertained to the rankings.
II. LAW SCHOOLS
The field of legal education is dominated by US. News's annual ranking. No other
ranking comes close in popularity or influence, especially among prospective
students. 1  US. News first ranked law schools in 1987 and began ranking them
annually beginning in 1990. While US. News also ranks undergraduate institutions,
other professional schools, and graduate programs, law schools are treated uniquely.
Whereas only the top 50 schools in the other professional fields are ranked, the
magazine ranks each law school accredited by the ABA. During most of the period
since 1990, law schools were divided into four tiers: the top tier listed the fifty highest-
rated programs in order of rank, while the remaining schools were separated into the
second, third, and fourth tiers and listed alphabetically within these tiers. Beginning
with the 2004 rankings, US. News reported the top 100 law schools by rank, and
divided the remainder of the schools into the third and fourth tier, again listing these
schools alphabetically. One reason why rankings have had a powerful effect on law
schools is that US. News publicly evaluates every school, not just the top schools.
U.S. News rankings are comprised of four general categories: reputation, selectivity,
placement success, and faculty resources. While some adjustments have been made in
the methods used to construct the rankings, their basic structure has remained the same.
Reputation decides 40% of a school's overall score and is determined according to
responses to surveys that are sent to academics and practitioners. Respondents are
asked to rank each of the approximately 180 accredited law schools in the U.S.
according to a five-point scale. The ratings of academics are weighted more heavily in
the overall score (25%) than are the ratings of practitioners (15%). The survey of
academics is sent to the dean, associate dean, chair of recruitment, and the last tenured
faculty member of each ranked law school.
The selectivity of the law school accounts for 25% of the overall score and is
determined by three factors. Student LSAT scores count for 50% of the selectivity
11. The Educational Quality Rankings of U.S. Law Schools (now Leiter's Law School
Rankings) produced by Brian Leiter was the only other ranking mentioned with any frequency
in our interviews with administrators. Leiter's Law School Rankings,
http://www.leiterrankings.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2005). While some deans prefer these
rankings since they emphasize faculty productivity, they were not viewed as a serious
competitor to U.S. News, especially for prospective students.
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ranking (12.5% of the overall score), while GPA represents 40% (10% overall).
Finally, the acceptance rate of a school, the ratio of students accepted to the number of
students who applied, accounts for 10% of the selectivity score (2.5% overall).
Placement success accounts for 20% of the overall ranking. It is determined by three
measures: percent of students employed at graduation, percent employed nine months
after graduation, and the bar passage rate. These factors account for 30%, 60%, and
10% of the placement score, respectively, and 6%, 12%, and 3% of the overall ranking.
Finally, faculty resources represents 15% of the overall ranking and is composed of
four separate measures: expenditure rate per student (for instruction, library, and
supporting services), student-faculty ratio, "other" per-student spending (primarily
financial aid), and volumes in library. These factors account for 65%, 20%, 10%, and
5% of the faculty resources indicator, respectively.
Table 1. U.S. News rank weighting by category of evaluation
Weight in Weight in
General overall general Weight in
categories score Subcategories category overall score
Reputation 40% Academics (dean, associate
dean, chair of recruitment, 62.5% 25%
last tenured faculty member)
Practitioners 37.5% 15%
Selectivity 25% Student [SAT scores 50% 12.5%
Student GPA 40% 10%
Acceptance rate 10% 2.5%
Placement 20% Percent employed at 30% 6%
success graduation
Percent employed nine 60% 12%
months after graduation
Bar passage rate 10% 3%
Faculty 15% Library expenditure rate per 65% 9.75%
resources student
Student faculty ratio 20% 3%
Other per-student spending 10% 1.5%
(e.g. financial aid)
Volumes in library 5% .75%
Source: U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, AMERICA'S BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS 2005 50 (2005).
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To compile the ranking, each school's score is standardized. These scores are then
weighted, totaled, and rescaled so that the top school receives a score of 100 and other
schools receive a percentage of the top score. 12 In addition to these composite
rankings, eight specialty programs are also evaluated. Less information is available
about how these rankings are created, but they are based on surveys sent to legal
educators who pick the top 15 schools for the designated specialties. In the most recent
rankings issue, for example, U.S. News evaluated specialties in clinical training,
dispute resolution, environmental law, healthcare law, intellectual property law,
international law, tax law, and trial advocacy.
A. The Effects of Rankings
To date, there has been spirited debate about the positive and negative
consequences of the law school rankings but surprisingly little empirical research
addresses their effects.' 3 Consequently, the main goal of our larger project is to specify
12. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, AMERICA'S BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS 2005, 50 (2005).
13. See generally, Mitchell Berger, Why the U.S. News and World Report Law School
Rankings Are Both Useful and Important, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 487 (2001); Paul L. Caron and
Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can LearnfromBillyBeane and the OaklandAthletics, 82 TEX.
L. REv. 1483 (2004); Russell B. Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to
Coordination and Collective Action Problem, 77 TEX. L. REv. 403 (1998); Nancy B. Rapoport,
Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. News & World Report Shouldn't Want to Be Compared to
Time andNewsweek-or the New Yorker, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (1999); Jane Easter Bahls, The
Ranking Game, STUDENT LAW, Mar. 2003, available at http://www.abanet.org/
lsd/stulawyer/mar03/rankinggame.html; Dale Whitman, Doing the Right Thing, THE
NEWSLETTER, Apr. 2002, at 1.
A notable exception is Richard Schmalbeck's analysis of the relationship between law school
rank and reputation scores. See Richard Schmalbeck, The Durability ofLaw School Reputation,
48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 568 (1998). Focusing on schools in the top 50, he finds that the reputations
of law schools are relatively durable and that rankings have done little to change perceptions of
school quality among those who fill out the US. News survey; a drop in rank during one year,
for instance, does not have a negative effect on a school's reputation score in the following
year's survey. Thus, Schmalbeck is cautiously optimistic that the rankings have only limited
effects on law school reputations. Research concerning the effects of rankings in other fields,
though similarly sparse, has produced compelling results. James Monks and Ronald G.
Ehrenberg's study of elite colleges shows that movement in rank affects the number of
applicants these colleges received, their selectivity in admissions, their yield rate, and how they
deployed scholarship money. James Monks & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, The Impact of U.S. News
& World Report College Rankings on Admissions Outcomes and Pricing Policies at Selective
Private Institutions (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7227, 1999). Elsbach
and Kramer find that even small changes in business school rankings evoke an "organizational
identity crisis." Kimberly D. Elsbach and Roderick M. Kramer, Members' Responses to
Organizational Identity Threats: Encountering and Countering the Business Week Rankings,
41 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 442 (1996). McDonough et al., in their analysis of how prospective
undergraduates use rankings, argue that rankings intensify the "reputation game" played by
colleges as they focus the attention of prospective students on the purported prestige of schools
rather than on the fit between the school and the particular student's interests and needs. Patricia
McDonough, Anthony Lising Antonio, MaryBeth Walpole & Leonor Perez, College Rankings:
Democratized College Knowledge for Whom?, 39 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 513, 531 (1995).
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the effects of U.S. News ranking on legal education. Although our central concern here
is not to document ranking effects, our broader findings do suggest that rankings have
prompted important changes in legal education.14 Most generally, we argue that
rankings influence many aspects of legal education: they have profoundly altered the
terms under which law schools are accountable to their constituents; they influence a
broad range of decisions; and they have changed how many in the legal community
make sense of the identity of their own and others' schools. Two brief examples give a
sense of the tangible consequences of these changes.
First, the U.S. News ranking has clearly altered the distribution of resources-
resources of time, money, and attention-within law schools. As one dean described it:
Almost everything we do now is prefaced by, "How will this affect our ranking?"
That never was the case before. We did things according to what we thought was
best for the law school; we did not do things because we thought they were good
for our law school rankings. And I think there is a difference between the two.
Tons of money-not just here, but at other law schools around the country-is
being spent on public relations now that was never spent before. I cannot tell you
how many wastebaskets of crap that I throw away-glossy, expensive crap that I
get from law schools all over the country in an effort to advertise themselves.' 
5
In addition to a steep increase in the amount of money spent on promotional material
and other forms of marketing, many administrators note that rankings have prompted
schools to spend much more money on merit scholarships than in the past, as schools
attempt to attract students who score well on a key component of rankings.
Second, rankings have also changed the nature of many administrative positions by
constraining the discretion of administrators and controlling the terms of their
accountability. One clear example of this is in the field of career services. Rankings
have forced schools to be more attentive to their placement outcomes, and while this
attention is welcome, it does not always take constructive forms. Pressure to boost
placement statistics has encouraged schools to broaden their definition of employment
to include non-legal jobs and to invest heavily in tracking students who do not respond
to their employment surveys. As one director of career services explained, schools
must invest heavily in tracking down students:
It just takes an enormous amount of time that would otherwise be spent on
advising. We spend at least a day a week [on it] .... And I am the only career
counselor at this point, I'm the only career counselor for [over 500] students.
That's time where students can't come to me.' 6
14. Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News &
World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2006); Wendy Espeland & Michael Sauder, Quantitative Authority and the
Reflexivity of Rankings (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association, Chicago, Ill., June 3-7, 2004) (on file with author); Wendy Espeland & Michael
Sauder, The Allure of Numbers: Law School Rankings and the Rationalization of Reputation
(paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
June 5-8, 2003) (on file with author).
15. Authors' interview with a law school dean; see also supra note 3.
16. Authors' interview with a director of career services; see also supra note 3.
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Many in career services complain that instead of helping students define and prepare
for their career goals, they are forced to spend time harassing them for employment
statistics, a practice which undermines much of what they find satisfying about their
jobs.
While these examples highlight a few of the negative effects of the U.S. News
ranking, it is also important to recognize the positive effects that some attribute to
rankings. Some legal educators believe rankings provide a valuable service. Although a
distinct minority of deans refused to sign the letter critical of law school rankings, at
least some deans view the U.S. News ranking as a helpful if imperfect measure of
performance. 17 For this group, rankings formalize well-known, if ambiguous,
reputations; provide students and administrators with useful information; and provide
valid benchmarks for schools to use to improve themselves. As one dean put it:
In the past a dean could pontificate about how great his program was, but now it's
harder to pull the wool over people's eyes. With these numbers, you can't just talk.
The basic things that law schools do are still all there: we want to get the best
students, the best faculty, and we want our students to be successful. Our job and
our career goals haven't changed, but now we have metrics. I think it's just like
Consumer Reports for cars. You can quarrel with individual things, you can
quibble with the formula, but we have a wonderful product and it's good for
people to know.
18
According to this view, rankings not only provide useful information to external
constituents, they also require law schools to be more accountable for the education
that they provide while supplying law schools with useful performance measures.
Given the effects of the U.S. News ranking, our goal here is to examine why this
ranking has become so influential for law schools. We propose that one significant
factor that contributes to this influence is that the field of legal education is dominated
by a single ranker. The dominance of a single ranker creates three key problems for
law schools-small changes and small differences gain disproportionate importance,
control over reputation is severely restricted, and the validity of rankings goes
unquestioned-and show how these problems exacerbate the consequences of being
ranked. We use the case of business schools and their rankings to suggest how multiple
rankings mitigate some of the negative effects caused by these problems.
B. The Importance of Small Differences
One common criticism of the US. News ranking is that it misrepresents the actual
distribution of law school quality. Leaving aside the serious methodological and
measurement questions that have been raised about rankings,' 9 many administrators
17. Only 10 of the 187 deans refused to sign the letter. Law School Admissions Council,
supra note 1.
18. Authors' interview with a law school dean; see also supra note 3.
19. This is not meant to downplay the importance of the methodological problems with the
US. News ranking, but these problems are not the focus of this study. For critiques, see Richard
Lempert, Pseudo Science as News: Ranking the Nation's Law Schools (paper presented at
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believe that the act of ranking in itself skews perceptions of the quality of law schools.
The precise nature of rankings both creates the perception of differences in school
quality where none exists (e.g., with the very precise ordinal rankings of the top 100
schools) and exaggerates small differences in quality (especially at the cusps between
tiers). By magnifying the importance of trivial differences, rankings change the
phenomena that they purport only to measure.
While some argue that these small differences in rank are insignificant-and
statistically speaking, they would be correct-the differences matter to law schools
because they are meaningful to influential external constituents. It is important whether
a school is 9th or 12th, 23rd or 28th, second-tier or third-tier, because these small
differences have a significant influence on how constituents perceive and behave
toward law schools: many administrators believe that they influence prospective
students' decisions about which schools to attend, employers' decisions about whom to
hire, and the decisions of alumni about how much to give to their alma maters. Michael
Sauder and Ryon Lancaster's forthcoming statistical analysis of school-by-school
admissions data and ranking over time supports this claim for prospective students;
they find that rank has significant effects on the total number of applications schools
receive, the applications schools receive from top students, and the schools'
matriculation rates.2°
Because they believe these small differences to be decisive, law schools are
pressured to optimize their ranking by adopting such strategies as basing admissions
decisions more heavily on LSAT scores, spending more money on merit-based
scholarships in order to "buy" top students, or producing expensive glossy brochures to
be sent to those who fill out the U.S. News survey. The importance of small differences
suggests why law schools devote so much attention and so many resources to the
rankings while simultaneously claiming that the rankings are unsound. As one dean
explained,
You have people who focus on whether or not the rankings are in fact valid,
whether they really show anything, whether the methodology is good, and so on.
And those debates can seem endless at times as everybody kind of decries the
rankings. On the flip side, you have the pragmatic reality of the rankings....
Whatever the validity of the methodology, it's difficult to pretend that the rankings
don't matter. I mean, prospective students use them; employers use them;
university administrators use them. So whether we in legal academics think they're
valid or not, whether they're reflective or not, the truth is that I don't think you
can just ignore them.2 1
In other words, one reason law schools attempt to maximize their rankings is because
small differences can have considerable effects on the actual quality of the school by
altering how outside audiences perceive a school and behave toward it.
American Association of Law Schools, New Orleans: Jan. 2002) (on file with author); STEPHEN
P. KLEIN & LAURA HAMILTON, THE VALIDITY OF THE U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT RANKING
OF ABA LAW SCHOOLS (1998), http://www.aals.org/validity.html. For a discussion of important
school characteristics that are neglected in U.S. News rankings, see supra text accompanying
note 2. Given these criticisms, the precise distinctions made by U.S. News for something as
complex and hard to quantify as law school quality are difficult to justify.
20. See Sauder & Lancaster, supra note 14.
21. Authors' interview with a law school dean; see also supra note 3.
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The effects of this emphasis on small differences become clear when schools drop
in the rankings. These drops cause ripples of activity throughout the institution:
administrators call town meetings or issue public statements to explain even small
drops in the rankings; they report receiving phone calls and e-mails from alumni,
students, and local media over such falls; concerns about the school's standing and
trajectory are raised in faculty meetings; and, because student self-images are tied
closely to the rank of their schools, these drops cause some students--even those at
"elite" schools-to experience feelings of inadequacy or, more often, betrayal. As one
dean reported:
There was one year that [our school] dropped out of the top twenty-five.... The
students were devastated-they thought they had come to a top twenty-five school
and, my goodness, they were only at a top [thirty] school. 22
While these small changes affect schools no matter where they rank, they are most
consequential for schools located on the cusps between the tiers created by the
rankings. These are the points where statistically insignificant differences in rank can
make schools appear qualitatively different. Schools of the same quality look vastly
different in U.S. News's aimual publication if one is ranked 50th and the other is
ranked 51st. Again, changes in rank demonstrate this well:
When we dropped [out of the first tier], we weren't called fifty-first, we were
suddenly in this undifferentiated alphabetized thing called the second tier. So the
[local newspaper's] headline is '[School X] Law School Drops to Second Tier.'
My students have a huge upset: 'Why are we a second tier school? What's
happened to make us a second tier school?'
23
Small differences and small changes in rank matter to schools because they matter to
influential outside audiences; reasonably, administrators react to this hyper-precision
by attempting to maximize their rank as best they can. In this way we can see how this
aspect of rankings contributes to some of their most negative effects.
C. Loss of Reputational Control
A second effect of the US. News ranking is that it limits schools' control over their
reputations. The U.S. News ranking has created a prominent definition of law school
quality to which students and other constituents pay close attention. This definition,
according to many administrators, overshadows other distinctive characteristics around
which schools have traditionally developed and fostered their identities. According to
the administrators' view, schools are qualitatively different institutions, each with their
own distinctive missions, strengths, and specialties.24 As such, they should be able to
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See BURTON R. CLARK, THE DisTINcTrE COLLEGE: ANTIOCH, REED, AND SWARTHMORE
(1970) (showing how universities conduct themselves as distinctive institutions with unique
identities); Burton R. Clark, The Organizational Saga in Higher Education, 17 ADMIN. Sci. Q.
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craft their reputations to their strengths, developing strategies for marketing themselves
to students who would benefit most from or be most interested in these qualities.
Because of the ranking, however, administrators believe it is much more difficult now
for schools to craft their reputations because the definition of the school embedded in
the rankings eclipses the unique characteristics and strengths of a particular school. As
one dean explained,
There is this kind of fraud that the rankings perpetrate about "you're a fourth-tier
school so you must not be any good," or "you're a first-tier school so really great
things are happening there." The truth is that most American law schools are...
unique places. When people are looking at law schools we always encourage them
to go look at the place because not every place is for everybody, and. . . there are
radically different approaches to teaching, there are radically different approaches
on all kinds of things.
25
While the limitation of reputational control may seem a rather abstract effect of the
U.S. News ranking, the consequences of this change are very tangible for admissions
personnel as they try to convince prospective students that their school is right for
them. When asked how they counter students' obsession with rankings, admissions
officers often try to invoke the idea of "fit" between the school's strength and the
student's interests. The notion of "fit" implies that the quality of specific programs as
well as a student's comfort level at the school is as important as the general standing of
the institution. These same admissions officers, however, noted that this idea of "fit"
has been pushed to the background as students increasingly base their decisions on
US. News rankings.
The effects of this loss of reputational control stretch beyond student recruitment,
limiting the claims that schools can make in more subtle and damaging ways. The
universal and standardized criteria used to construct rankings imply that all law schools
are essentially the same thing: they all have the same goals and motives and can be
fairly compared with each other along the same set of dimensions. Such
commensuration squarely contradicts the schools' notions of themselves as unique
institutions; nevertheless, by introducing a powerful definition of what a quality law
school is, US. News privileges one definition of what a law schools should be over all
others. This punishes schools whose missions deviate from this definition and
encourages schools to make changes to maximize their standing according to the
definition put forth by US. News:
It's wrong that a school that has a mission that's not Harvard or Chicago to be
slapped and say, "Why, you're a crummy school, because you're not doing what
Harvard is doing." So that's the devastation. It makes all of us spend hundreds of
thousands of dollars on marketing stuff that we have to do. 26
The ability of law schools to create a reputation based on values other than those used
by US. News to construct the rankings is now restricted. This is why one fear
commonly expressed by members of the legal education community is that the rankings
178 (1972) (highlighting the non-structural and non-rational dimensions of organizations of
higher education).
25. Authors' interview with a law school dean; see also supra note 3.
26. Authors' interview with school administrator; see also supra note 3.
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will have a homogenizing effect on the field." Schools with missions that diverge
from the "ideal" law school-as implicitly defined by the criteria and the weights
assigned to the criteria of the US. News rankings-face the dilemma of either
modifying their missions so as to fare better in the rankings or stay true to their
missions and risk the stigma of being perceived as a "bad law school" by those who use
the rankings uncritically. 28 In other words, if one accepts the US. News rankings' very
specific definition of the values by which law school reputation is evaluated, and if one
believes that all law schools are attempting to do as well as possible based on these
criteria, then different law schools look like inferior law schools. The U.S. News
rankings limit the claims that law schools can make about their standing in the law
school community, and in doing so create a pressure for schools to become more
homogenous.
29
D. Rankings Appear Valid
A third and related problem created by a single ranker is that administrators believe
that external constituents, especially prospective students, are uncritical consumers of
the rankings. Many administrators see their constituents treating the rankings "like the
bible" or as if they are "written in stone." As one current law school student explained,
Students who use U.S. News aren't necessarily concerned about measurement error
in the rankings. The ranking is important in itself I know I wasn't concerned with
methods. I just figured they knew what they are talking about and I didn't know
any way to compare their schools and so I wasn't concerned about measuring
errors or how accurate the rankings were. I knew that this is what everybody was
looking at aq what everybody else is using, so I was willing to take [US. News's]
word for it.
27. See Stake, supra note 7.
28. Examples would be schools that emphasize access to legal education, accept under-
represented students as well as those with high LSAT scores and GPA's, or are committed to
public interest as opposed to, for instance, corporate law.
29. Research on organizations, cognitive psychology, and behavior economics demonstrate
biases in how people assess risk, interpret change, and process information. See JAMES G.
MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958) (explaining various postulates in
organization theory about responses to differing motivational constraints); HERBERT A. SIMON,
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1958) (studying the understanding of decision-making
processes in administrative organizations in response to inputs); Daniel Kahnemann and Amos
Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1994); Richard Thaler,
Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199 (1985); Amos Tversky,
Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Personal Choice, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 327 (1972); Amos
Tversky, Intransitivity of Preferences, 79 PSYCH. REV. 281 (1977). See also Carol Heimer,
Cases and Biographies: An Essay on Routinization and the Nature of Comparison, 27 ANN.
REV. Soc. 47 (2001) (discussing how different ways of organizing information can have
important effects on what is being evaluated). Schools, like people, can be assessed as either
"individuals" or as "composites of numbers," and the choice of evaluative mode will have a
significant effect on how the school is evaluated.
30. Authors' interview with a law school student; see also supra note 3.
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Some attribute this uncritical stance to the "aura of objectivity" and scientific
implications that accompany such precise statistical presentations. As one dean said,
"[it is] the reification of this stuff to the decimal point that makes it look like a science
and is what makes [the ranking] so destructive.",3' Some administrators also point out
that the rankings are so readily accepted because it saves prospective students from
doing a lot of research about which school is best for them; they simply check a
school's current rank.
One problem with the uncritical acceptance of the ranking's validity is that the
ranking presents just one of many possible-and equally justifiable-ways to
conceptualize law school quality. The arbitrary aspects are easy to overlook if one is
uncritical. Not only are the methodological problems of the rankings pushed to the
background, but so too are the very influential and often taken-for-granted background
decisions and assumptions about which factors are included in the rankings and how
weights are assigned to these factors. These decisions are consequential and difficult to
justify, since there are multiple appropriate criteria and since alternative weights would
be equally defensible. 32 One dean said, "I think probably the biggest danger [is] people
thinking that the rankings are anything more than one set of opinions. 33 Adding insult
to injury for the administrators, this dominant definition of law school quality is
produced by non-experts in legal education. These very influential decisions about the
construction of the rankings have been made by journalists and statisticians: "The scam
is that what they have done on their own is determine what the standards are that they
are going to use for ranking institutions. And they have managed to get people to buy
into those standards."
34
A second problem created by an uncritical approach to the ranking is more
practical. The literalness with which outside audiences use rankings is consequential
because, as was discussed above, each small distinction made by the rankings-again,
a distinction that is likely to be statistically meaningless-is reified as a real difference
among schools in the eyes of constituents. As one administrator explained:
The difference between a school that is 15th and a school that is 16th and a school
that's 19th and a school that's 25th and the difference between a school that is
60th and one that is 50th-none of them in any sense could be quantifiably
justified in anything other than a set of arbitrary stop points that people have
made. But any time you put anything in an ordinal ranking, people tend to treat
each stop point as if it matters. From my perspective, that's just not rational
behavior but it's perfectly consistent with the way all of us treat everything. 35
31. Authors' interview with a law school dean; see also supra note 3.
32. The influence of these weights is demonstrated in a web site developed by Jeffrey Stake
that allows students to determine the weight of each factor according to their own preferences.
Jeffrey E. Stake, The Law School Ranking Game (2005), http://monoborg.law.indiana.edu/
LawRank/index.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2005). As Stake's "Ranking Game" shows, even
small changes in the relative weights of these variables can make substantial differences in the
rank ordering of schools.
33. Authors' interview with a law school dean; see also supra note 3.
34. Id.
35. Authors' interview with a law school administrator; see also supra note 3.
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And, when these differences are taken to be real, they become real in their
consequences for these schools.
III. BUSINESS SCHOOLS: THE EFFECTS OF MULTIPLE RANKERS
In sharp contrast to law schools rankings, there are five or six influential business
school rankings and a host of others that receive some attention. On average, business
school administrators estimate that they provide information for twenty to forty
different rankers. While there are many rankings to which business schools and their
constituents pay attention and a few are consistently cited as having more influence
than others, no single ranking dominates the definition of business school reputation.
Business Week, according to our interviews, stands out as the most important ranking
to administrators, followed closely by U.S. News. The rankings published by The Wall
Street Journal, Financial Times, and The Economist also receive significant attention,
while the ranking produced by Forbes was also noted by many as gaining increasing
influence. 36 Further complicating this reputational terrain, Business Week was most
often mentioned as the ranking that was the most flawed methodologically, followed by
The Wall Street Journal and Forbes.
37
Because there is no dominant ranker of business schools-no ranker plays the role
that U.S. News does for law schools-all of the rankings described above play some
role in defining a school's reputation. Furthermore, because all of the rankers use
different formulas to determine the relative standing of business schools, the rankings
that they produce differ markedly from each other. Business Week, for example, bases
its rankings primarily on surveys of student and recruiter satisfaction; U.S. News, as
with law schools, constructs its rankings around reputation surveys, and admissions and
placement criteria; The Financial Times combines over twenty criteria, but emphasizes
salary of graduates over everything else; and The Wall Street Journal builds its ranking
solely around an elaborate survey of employers.
38
These competing rankings have not made business schools immune to the effects of
rankings. Like law schools, business schools redistribute resources, change inter-
organizational activity, and devise gaming strategies as a result of these external
evaluations. What these multiple rankings have done, however, is minimize the impact
of some of the key problems the rankings create by producing ambiguity about the
precise standing of these schools. This ambiguity diminishes the impact of small
36. As one might suspect, the ranking that is perceived as most important is often related to
how well the school of the administrator is ranked by a particular publication. Not surprisingly,
schools tend to like the rankings that paint them in the best light, and-as we will see below-
this is one of the primary advantages of multiple rankers.
37. Several administrators indicated that there is also cross-national variation in regard to
the influence of particular rankings. As one dean said, "If they are international students, they
tend to look at The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal and a little bit at U.S. News,
and if they are American students they look heavily at Business Week and US. News." Authors'
interview with a law school dean; see also supra note 3.
38. Jerold L. Zimmerman, Can American Business Schools Survive? (Simon School of
Business Working Paper, Paper No. FR 01-16, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=283112 (warning of the demise of American management education because of
increasing pressures to spend funds on media rankings).
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changes, allows business schools to maintain a significant degree of reputational
control, and undermines to some extent the validity of the rankings. In addition,
business school administrators are considerably less concerned about the effects of
rankings than their law school counterparts, most often characterizing these effects as
having both positive and negative consequences for business education. While this
more positive attitude might partially be explained by the fact that business school
deans are more comfortable with the idea of market measures and market logics, the
ambiguity created by multiple rankings softens the overall influence of rankings and,
we argue, helps explain their more conciliatory attitudes.
A. The Ambiguity of Multiple Rankings
An important consequence of the multiple rankings of business schools is that they
create an ambiguous signal about where schools stand in relation to one another. While
a few of the deans we interviewed reported that their schools are ranked similarly
across the most influential ranking publications, most rankings of most schools vary,
often considerably, depending on the publication. 39 One dean reported that his
school's rankings ranged from the low twenties to the eighties in the most influential
publications.4 ° Several other deans reported that their schools were not ranked at all in
some of these same influential publications while they were highly ranked in others.
This ambiguity is complicated by the sheer number of publications that produce
business school rankings. And while some have more influence than others, all of them
have at least some influence with specific constituents:
I would say [the order of influence] is something like Business Week, The Wall
Street Journal, and US. News. Then there is The Financial Times and the
Economist and Forbes. Those are the six that we follow closely and there are a
whole bunch of others that come and go, but those have power because they're
institutions that are widely read among business people.... A school like [ours]
will have maybe thirty or forty rankings a year where people are asking for
information.4'
Business schools face a situation where there are different appraisals of their
relative standing, and it is unclear how to evaluate these different appraisals against
one another. These ambiguities are especially true for external constituents-such as
the prospective students that drive many of the effects of rankings-who rely heavily
on these rankings and often have little first-hand knowledge about the hierarchy of
39. In one sense, even the schools that look the same across rankings cannot escape the
ambiguity created by multiple rankings. Given that most of the schools rank considerably
differently according to different rankers, even the few schools that do not experience this
variation might appear very different to, for instance, a student making a decision between two
or three specific schools. This is because even schools with relatively static rankings are being
compared to schools that look different depending on what sources are consulted, and the
perceived relative position of schools with static rankings will change accordingly.
40. Authors' interview with a business school dean; see also supra note 3. The "top
publications" referred to here are Business Week, U.S. News, The Wall Street Journal, The
Financial Times, and Forbes.
41. Authors' interview with a business school administrator; see also supra note 3.
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business schools; and again, these ambiguities are pushed to the background for the
similarly situated external constituents of law schools.
Many administrators express fiustration about the variation in rankings of their
school but they also recognize that these differences are a result of the different criteria
rankers use to evaluate the schools. For a few schools, large differences in rank across
publications can be attributed to the fact that their school's strengths are reflected
particularly well in one or two of the rankings. One dean, for example, noted:
We do really well in The Wall Street Journal, but it's biased really well in our
favor. It's a survey of only corporate recruiters and it does a whole lot of them;
and because we're a big school, we have a lot of companies that have a
relationship with us. So we do well with that.42
Most schools, however, view these variations as evidence of the methodological
limitations of the rankings, arguing that good measures of quality could not produce
such a high degree of variation.
Putting aside the origins of these differences among rankers, it is clear that they
produce considerable ambiguity about the relative standing of business schools. But
how does this ambiguity created by multiple rankers affect the field of business
education, especially as compared to the effects that the US. News ranking has had on
law schools? There is almost complete agreement among the business school deans
interviewed for this project that the ambiguity produced by the existence of multiple
rankings is much more beneficial than harmful to business schools. The existence of
multiple rankings weakens the effects of small differences and small changes in rank, it
provides schools with greater reputational control and flexibility, and it encourages the
perception that there are many different ways to judge the quality of schools, thus
undermining the power of any one ranking as well as of rankings in general.
B. Weakens the Impact of Small Changes in Rank
One advantage of multiple rankings for business schools is that the effects of small
differences or fluctuations in rank are diluted by the various sources of rankings that
external audiences have available to them. Unlike at law schools, where administrators
are justifiably concerned about minor oscillations in their U.S. News ranking,43
business school deans have consistently reported that small changes in rank had little
effect on their actions or, as far as they could tell, the actions of their constituents." As
one dean said, "The good thing about business schools is that there are so damn many
of these rankings that no one is especially dominant. Every time somebody else does
one, it mutes the impact of all the others. ' 45 Because of this, business school deans
42. Authors' interview with a business school dean; see also supra note 3.
43. See Sauder & Lancaster, supra note 14.
44. Authors' interview with business school deans; see also supra note 3. These claims
were often accompanied by a few caveats. For example, deans reported that they would be
concerned if their school experienced small drops in several rankings simultaneously. In
addition, many deans noted that a big drop in one of the rankings would be of concern, although
it was not always clear how far of a drop those interviewed would consider "big." Id.
45. Authors' interview with a business school dean; see also supra note 3.
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tend to look at how well their schools rank across the most popular rankings and are
less concerned about the changes in any specific ranking:
What I've taken to focus on is really an average of the six rankings. For stable
numbers you do it that way-if you just look at one you bounce around a lot.
Whenever it comes out, I send out an attachment that has the average of all six. It
shows that there are different ways to assess quality, and if you look at an average
of rankings, it is very stable-you don't get these weird anomalies because most of
the top ten schools are there all of the time. Even if they change in any one year,
they're not going to go up ten spaces or down ten spaces, but on any one of those
things you could do that just because of some statistical anomaly or sampling. And
so the problem with law schools is that if you only have one-it's very simple-
but the problem is that one school could go from twenty-five to fifteen, and then
the next year they are thirty-five-how's that possible? Most schools don't change
that much. So I do think that we have a more stable system now that we have a
whole bunch of them. It is amazing that it does get very stable when you get six
people trying to measure fundamentally the same thing in six different ways and
you take an average of all that, you get a pretty stable number. You don't get
anybody bouncing very much.46
As this statement indicates, multiple rankings moderate one of the primary concerns of
law schools: random statistical variations will cause their schools tangible harm.
This benefit of multiple rankings also helps explain why business school
administrators react more favorably to rankings than their law school counterparts. One
of the primary ways in which deans of business schools differ from law school deans is
in how they interpret this relatively new external influence on their activities. They are
much more likely to accept the rankings as legitimate measures of quality, view the
rankings as useful signals of performance, and react to them accordingly. Legal
educators on the other hand, are more likely to view rankings as poor signals that, even
if they do motivate action, will motivate it in the wrong directions. While business
school administrators often attributed this acceptance of the rankings to a
corresponding acceptance of market measures or business methods, the fact that the
negative effects of the rankings are mitigated by their number contributes to their more
sanguine reaction.
C. Increased Reputational Flexibility
A second advantage of multiple rankings emphasized by business school
administrators is that they allow schools more control over their reputations. There are
several ways in which multiple rankings lead to this control. First, because there are so
many rankings that use very different methodologies, business schools have many
opportunities to rank well according to the criteria of at least one publication. The
existence of multiple rankings, one dean argued, "is an advantage to the extent that it
allows all of us to point out that we're number one somewhere. It's the old adage that,
if you ask who the top twenty-five schools are, there are at least a hundred that claim





schools-unlike law schools with their single dominant ranking-to make claims about
being among the elite, claims that are perceived as legitimate because they are based
on the evaluation of a disinterested third party.
This claims-making ability is seen by business school administrators as a tangible
benefit of the ambiguity created by multiple rankings. An obvious marketing strategy
for schools is to choose the rankings that present them in the best light and then
promote or advertise their schools accordingly. As one dean explained:
We look where we do well, and we make sure that people know that we did well
there. We do some ads in [a few magazines], and we pick our best ranking to
compare with schools that we compete with and show people how we stand
compared to them. We use them that way, as a source of information. The
Economist is doing [a ranking] now and so is The Financial Times, so you look at
the sub-components as well as the overall ranking to see if you are really at the top
of some sub-components. And everybody is doing that game.
48
As this statement implies, this use of the rankings is widespread, and most deans
consider it common sense; as one administrator put it, "You're not stupid. If you do
well in one ranking and not well in another, guess which one you're going to talk
about.
' 49
This ambiguity is also valuable for administrators as they discuss the strengths and
overall quality of their school with constituents. When asked how he used the multiple
rankings, one dean replied:
I can always placate people by saying that maybe we're in the second tier in
Business Week, but look at all these other rankings. I tell people, "Why do you
care about this one? I have all these other ones that say we're good. Don't you
know how to measure?" There are all these stupid games you can play.50
In this way, rankings provide business schools and their administrators with some
flexibility and room for maneuvering when representing the quality of their school to
external constituents.
Just as importantly, many administrators believe that the ambiguity created by
multiple rankings provides business schools with many options for changing or
building their future reputation. Most directly, a school can choose one ranking which
they believe best suits their school in terms of its strengths and its goals, and then this
school can redistribute resources in order to maximize their standing according to that
ranking. For some schools this may entail focusing on student satisfaction ratings for
Business Week, for others the recruiter appraisals for The Wall Street Journal, and for
still others the objective criteria, such as Graduate Management Admission Test
(GMAT) scores and grade point averages (GPAs), emphasized heavily by U.S. News.
This reputational flexibility created by multiple rankings has some important
indirect benefits as well. Many deans argued that, by creating different paths for






environment of innovation and experimentation in business school education that is not
seen in any other professional school fields:
The variety and the openness to rankings that business schools have allowed have
created a variety of programs that is healthy for students. Maybe law schools,
because of the nature of law, maybe it's better for them to be more stable and have
one curriculum for everybody. It's hard to measure, but I do think after looking at
this for a long time that the rankings of business schools have created a lot of
experimentation and I've been involved in it myself, so I know personally it is
true. It's kind of because what the rankings were pushing toward and what we felt
was better education was consistent and went the same way. But I think the
rankings did prod.51
Finally, many deans believe that the multitude of rankings has created new
opportunities for certain types of schools to build reputations. Many deans claim that
rankings have "opened up the market" of business education by making people more
aware of the quality of state schools, private schools not associated with prestigious
universities or well known for their business school, as well as small schools that have
strong specialty areas in business education. Because the rankings are a powerful
source of publicity for schools and because there is a variety of rankings that can be
used to gain this publicity, under-recognized schools can use the rankings as a
springboard in their attempts to establish their reputations.
D. Undermines the Idea of Rankings in General
A final advantage of multiple rankings is that, according to business school
administrators, they make consumers of the rankings-especially prospective students
and employers-more critical of the ranking process itself. This critical stance is, in a
sense, the product of the success of rankings in this field. Business schools are
evaluated by a multitude of rankers, all claiming to measure the same basic concept-
the quality of business schools-but producing much different results in their
measurements. As several administrators explained, this situation gives them the
opportunity to convincingly question the validity of the rankings when dealing with
external constituents:
It [the existence of multiple rankings] does help because you can look at it and say
we are here in one place, here in another, and here at this place. Essentially what
happens is that you can undermine the validity of rankings in general and say that
this is how they use certain criteria and maybe it's not as strong or whatever. And
this is telling you that you want to make some independent decisions about some
things. I think that people see that, and so it helps open people's eyes.
52
In addition, deans believe that the broad disparities in the results produced by multiple
rankers help their constituents understand the problems inherent to quantifying
complex relationships. As one dean said,
51. Id.
52. Authors' interview with a business school administrator; see also supra note 3.
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[The emergence of multiple rankings] is the best thing that has happened to us. In
the days gone by when Business Week was the only one that people looked at-
and even in the 1990s it was kind of like the leader, and it still is to a large extent,
but the fact that The Wall Street Journal and others have come on, and smaller
niche sort of magazines like the Grey Pinstripes which looks at schools to see if
they are ethical and if they are socially responsible and that kind of thing. All of
these have made students more critical in their judgments.... Now it has become
more complicated because it's not just one number but there are like ten of them
and they all might be different. 3
In short, these competing evaluations of business schools have created a more
sophisticated "rankings consciousness" among their constituents, and this stands in
stark contrast with legal education, where many administrators believe that external
audiences take rankings at face value.
Another general benefit of the ambiguity created by multiple rankings is that it
provides administrators with more discretion to improve the educational quality of
their schools. Many business school administrators noted that the greater number of
different rankings published and the greater ambiguity created by these rankings makes
it easier to administer their schools in the ways that they think best; the tension between
deciding what is best in terms of educational quality as opposed to what will lead to
ranking success is lessened. Along these lines, several deans admitted that they have
actively lobbied publications to create rankings of their own. One long-term dean
recalled,
One of the things I did... was that I made all of our data available to everybody. I
wanted everybody to do rankings. I met with Forbes and told them to do a
ranking-anyone who called me, The Financial Times or The Wall Street Journal,
I would tell them that we needed more rankings and that they should do them. I
wanted Better Homes and Gardens to do rankings. I want everyone to have a
ranking that they do good in, and secondly I want the next ranking that comes out
to have very little publicity .... The more rankings we have, the better off we
are.
54
In this way, the multiple rankings of business schools undermine the taken-for-granted
validity of the rankings that exists in the field of legal education. In doing so, the
multiple rankings also promote the idea that there are many ways to create a quality
business school. While the dominance of U.S. News rankings in the field of law schools
tends to oversimplify what it means to be a good law school, the multiple rankings of
business schools complicate what it means to be a good business school-a
complication that all of the business school administrators interviewed for this project
viewed as beneficial because it reinforces the idea that there are many different ways to
evaluate schools.





In this article we have suggested that the existence of a single dominant ranker of
law schools exacerbates some of the problems created by the rankings and that the
development of competing rankings could alleviate these problems. To support these
claims, we have shown how the multiple rankings ofbusiness schools help decrease the
importance of small differences and small changes in rank, permit schools to maintain
greater control over their reputations, and encourage users to be more cautious in their
interpretation of rankings. Although business school administrators still feel pressure to
do well in the rankings, our interviews indicate that they express less concern about the
negative consequences of rankings and attribute more benefits to them than do law
school administrators and faculty.
While the data presented in this paper emphasize the short-term advantages of
multiple rankings, there are also risks associated with the proliferation of rankings that
deserve consideration, and we would like to conclude by outlining those that we feel
are potentially most harmful. 55 One important risk concerns the long-term
consequences of the type of quantitative evaluation represented by rankings and the
new forms of accountability that it implies. Although multiple rankings are an
appealing strategy for mediating some of the most objectionable effects of U.S. News
rankings, the creation of new rankings will reinforce the dominance and legitimacy of
rankings more broadly. As some critics argue, more of a bad thing cannot lead to a
good thing; doing to themselves what others have imposed on law schools is a
concession, not a challenge, to the coercive power of rankings. In the end, the spread of
rankings may further marginalize alternative forms of evaluation and accountability.
It is also important to keep in mind that rankings are useful to some audiences
because they simplify complex information and relationships and because they are easy
to circulate. Yet we should be mindful of the hazards of this simplification, of being
seduced by the apparent objectivity and rigor of the rankings. As March and Simon
argued long ago, information that moves within and among organizations is edited in
ways that eliminate the tenuousness of its assumptions and the weakness of its
sources.56 As a result, the further information travels from its source, the more rigorous
and certain it appears. Ranks represent a radical editing process which absorbs both the
discretion and uncertainty that support their production. And, while multiple rankings
with variable outcomes reinsert some of this uncertainty back into the evaluation
process by casting doubt as to which is the best or most accurate measure, they still
represent a heroic simplification of a complex system. Rankings are the final product
of an elaborate, often messy, and sometimes arbitrary series of practices, decisions, and
coordination, the traces of which are hard to recover. For consumers of rankings, even
multiple rankings, rankings appear more transparent and definitive the further removed
they are from their production. The context of their production and the rich, local
55. We leave aside here the practical obstacles to the development of competing rankings,
obstacles that have played an important role in preventing the development of multiple law
school rankings to this point. These obstacles include the resistance to rankings in any form by
many members of the law school community, the difficulty of determining what factors should
be included and how factors should be weighed in any new ranking, and the market dominance
of U.S. News in this particular field.
56. MARCH & SIMON, supra note 29.
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knowledge that permits a less simplified and more nuanced interpretation becomes
increasingly difficult to recover for those who use rankings, and feedback about the
effects of rankings on the schools they measure becomes harder to obtain.57
A related hazard of rankings is that their proliferation threatens more nuanced and
more local analyses of quality. Even with multiple rankings, rankings incorporate only
a limited range of the possible indicators of quality, typically including factors that are
easy to measure, widely available, and standardized. The more attention that is focused
on rankings, the more likely it is that other distinctive characteristics of quality are
neglected. So, for example, schools that prepare lawyers to work with under-served
communities, schools with a strong commitment to diversity, and schools that foster an
especially supportive educational community will all have a harder time earning
recognition for these forms of excellence. Pluralistic modes of valuing represent a form
of diversity, a richness of expression, and an invitation to deliberation that we should
be wary of relinquishing too easily. Just as high test scores represent an extremely
limited understanding of intelligence or ability, excellence in legal education can take
many forms, not all of which can be easily reduced to numbers.
To the extent that quantification becomes the dominant trope of evaluation and the
most legitimate means of expressing important values, it reflexively reconstructs the
objects it measures-in this case, law schools-and in doing so threatens other systems
of meaning and other modes of expressing values. Alternative forms of constructing
evaluation and accountability, whether through deliberation, public debate, or in the
form of reasoned responses to particular public challenges, become less salient and
appropriate responses; local, particularized knowledge of institutions becomes
increasingly marginal as "accountability" and "evaluation" are reduced to techniques of
measurement.58
Related to these risks, a final characteristic of the proliferation of rankings is worth
noting. We have argued that the creation of multiple rankings is a promising strategy
for mediating the harmful effects of U.S. News's virtual monopoly of rankings in legal
education. The suggestion that multiple rankings might alleviate the problems created
by a single ranking is an illuminating example of the logic of the rationalism Max
Weber famously depicted as a primary feature ofwestern modernism. 59 In his analysis,
bureaucratization is one of the great accomplishments and most threatening aspects of
modernity, and quantification-with its impersonality and apparent objectivity, as well
as its expediency in reducing uncertainty, enhancing predictability, and assessing
value-serves as a key support to its broad authority. The technical advantages of
bureaucratic authority, especially once it is entrenched, make it virtually impossible for
57. See JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1998) (offering an illuminating and
complementary analysis of the effects of simplification on state development policies).
58. See Cris Shore & Susan Wright, Audit Culture andAnthropology: Neo-Liberalism in
British Higher Education, 5 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 557 (1999) (emphasizing how
audit techniques refract power relations, impose new forms of discipline, and mediate
inequality); Cris Shore & Susan Wright, Coercive Accountability: The Rise ofAudit Culture in
Higher Education, in AUDIT CULTURES 57 (Marilyn Strathem ed., 2000) (critiquing the
proliferation of "audit" techniques in connection with the global expansion of neo-liberal
policies).
59. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 987-89 (G. Roth and C. Wittich eds., University
of California Press 1978) (1913).
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alternative forms to compete effectively, and Weber is extremely pessimistic about our
capacity to limit the expansion of bureaucratic authority into more domains of our
lives. As he put it, the only way of stopping one bureaucracy is with another.
As the use of performance measures or audits to evaluate institutions and
individuals spreads across many domains-examples include business, government,
healthcare, philanthropy, and civic culture-the only means for countering the
influence of one measure is to create a competing measure. We can see in the diffusion
of rankings how techniques for rationalizing both narrow the range of alternative forms
of expression and simultaneously reproduce themselves through new techniques
premised on the same logic or novel adaptations and refinements. This is a small,
contemporary, and relatively trivial instance of Weber's larger claim that the only
means for effectively countering the authority and technical proficiency of one
bureaucracy is by creating another.
60
If we understand the creation of multiple rankings as a potential form of
professional resistance, as a means for reinserting professional discretion where it has
been removed by other forms of quantification and standardization, we can better
understand the proliferation and adaptation of the technologies of bureaucracy. One
measurement regime creates political incentives for developing alternative
measurements or techniques-techniques, for instance, that offer some small measure
of autonomy or privilege a particular position. Here, although the loss of discretion that
results from an imposed system of accountability creates the impetus to create new
evaluative strategies, these strategies must fit into the dominant measurement
frameworks. In this way, resistance breeds hegemony.
60. Id.
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